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This research aims to analyze the effect of good corporate governance and financial distress on real earnings 
management. The sample in this study is a manufacturing company listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 
2016-2020 period. Data collection in this study was carried out using secondary data taken from the company's 
financial statement. The data were analyzed and tested using the SPSS 25 program to test descriptive statistics 
and outlier tests. The Smart PLS 3.0 program was used to test validity and reliability, test quality indexes, and test 
hypotheses. The results of this study indicate that institutional ownership has a significant effect on real earnings 
management, managerial ownership has no significant effect on real earnings management, family ownership has 
no significant effect on real earnings management, the audit committee has a significant effect on real earnings 
management, audit quality has a significant effect on management. Financial distress has a significant effect on 
real earnings management. The moderating variable in this study proves that family ownership has no significant 
effect on real earnings management which is moderated by political connections.  
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Earnings management is an act of manipulating financial statements that have often been 
heard by exaggerating profits or minimizing profits (Santoso, 2021). The case allegedly carried 
out earnings management by PT Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk in 2017. In this case, it was 
found that there was manipulation of the recording of financial statements on receivables where 
the receivables were overstated by reaching IDR 1.4 trillion, inflation funds worth IDR 4 
trillion, revenue inflation of IDR 662 billion, EBITDA inflation of IDR 329 billion and there is 
a flow of funds of IDR 1.78 trillion to management (Wareza, 2019). PT Tiga Pilar Sejahtera 
Food also noted six distributors as third parties who have the context of investor protection. If 
a problem occurs, the third party is responsible. At the same time, the six distributor companies 
are affiliates (Mahadi, 2021).  
In the financial statements, information about company profits can be seen. Financial 
statements are the information needed by decision-makers (such as investors and creditors) to 
decide whether they can invest in the company. Managers in the company must take action so 
that the company's financial statements are presented perfectly (Ningsih, 2015). Therefore, the 
reported earnings information must be presented in a quality and related to cash flow. The 
attitude taken or taken by the company to generate good profits is earnings management. 
Earnings management is an administration which in the process of making financial 
statements is needed by outside parties because it affect earnings reporting. Management can 
use methods by making or creating regulations that speed up or slow down expenses and 
revenues, so the company's profits are according to company desired (Dwiyanti & Astriena, 
2018). The occurrence of earnings management due to the managers in the company who use 
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the strategy of accounting in recording profits plunged the financial statements, resulting in 
financial information conforming to the actual circumstances. 
Earnings management is always judged negatively because it presents financial 
information that is not in the right condition. This situation is due to the relationship of 
management with shareholders as well as interested parties collide or collide with each other. 
The management side expects a relatively high bonus by increasing or increasing the company's 
profits, while shareholders try to lower its profits to attract their shares back (Ningsih, 2015). 
Earnings management is divided into two approaches, namely real earnings management and 
accrual earnings management (Yulaeli, 2018). Research by Ningsih, (2015) results that 
managers prefer to do real earnings management than accrual earnings management. It is 
proven that is more difficult for auditors to find. Companies operated by family ownership 
structures or family business groups more likely to carry out earnings management actions. This 
situation causes a decrease in the quality of company earnings or an increase in the quality of 
company earnings by non-controlling and controlling shareholders.  
Good corporate governance arises because the relationship between agents and principals 
is not good. This unfavourable relationship is triggered by reasons that information is not strong 
enough, leading to information asymmetry that may be affected by earnings management 
(Hidayanti & Paramita, 2014). The principle of good corporate governance is a new pattern that 
can motivate the provision of bonus compensation to encourage management to manipulate the 
accounting numbers contained in the financial statements. To minimize conflicts with the 
parties concerned, financial reports prepared with accounting numbers are needed. The method 
used to control agency costs is through good corporate governance. Corporate governance is a 
rule that can regulate or coordinate the relationship between management, shareholders, 
government, creditors, employees and other external and internal stakeholders relating to the 
rights and obligations to control the company. There are four main factors to increase 
shareholder welfare and professionalism without leaving the interests of shareholders—
responsibility, transparency, fairness, and accountability (Susanto & Pradipta, 2016). 
Institutional ownership has the resources, capabilities, or opportunities to monitor, 
influence, and control managers' decisions in the company. Similarly, the literature shows that 
managers of highly concentrated firms have the opportunity to be closely monitored (Yulaeli, 
2018). If most company ownership is in the hands of a few people, then the company is highly 
concentrated. The fewer people who own many shares, the more reasons they should focus on 
investing and thus monitoring the management of company affairs (Farouk & Bashir, 2017). 
Institutional ownership is the structure of the shareholders owned by the institution. Institutional 
ownership has an important task in a company (Setiawati & Lieany, 2016). This role can control 
the management consisting of shareholders and managers. Institutional ownership can 
minimize disputes between shareholders and managers. The presentation of share ownership 
by the institution will impact the process of preparing the company's financial statements, which 
is impossible in the absence of earnings management. Institutional ownership usually plays a 
role in monitoring a company that ensures an increase in shareholder wealth due to a large 
investment in the company. Setiawati & Lieany (2016) shows research on the significant 
negative effect of institutional ownership on real earnings management. This situation shows 
that institutional ownership is the largest shareholder who can monitor the company's 
operations and limit managers to profit from themselves, so managers are not relaxed in 
manipulating real profits generated by the company. This research are in line with Susanto & 
Pradipta (2016) research. Then it can be formulated into the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Institutional ownership has a significant negative impact on real earnings management. 
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Shareholders can pressure managers to increase company profits, thereby achieving 
market value and because of this pressure, manager carry out earnings management. Managerial 
ownership can equalize the interests of managers and company investors because the manager 
is the manager and owner of the company. Managerial ownership is the ownership structure 
owned by company managers. There are many owners of the company's shares, one of which 
is owned by the manager. The company manager confirmed this action. This arrangement is 
because the manager's ownership determines policies and decisions related to forming financial 
statements following applicable standards (Hidayanti & Paramita, 2014). When a company has 
managerial ownership, it reflects the distribution of company power between managers and 
shareholders. Hidayanti & Paramita (2014) shows research on the significant positive impact 
of managerial ownership on real earnings management. It shows a higher managerial ownership 
structure will not change management's opportunistic attitude and behaviour on its real earnings 
management. This research are in line with Kamardin (2014) research. Then it can be 
formulated into the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Managerial ownership has a significant positive impact on real earnings management. 
 
Family ownership in companies can affect the quality of financial reports because 
families usually occupy or hold important positions in the company which causes family 
companies to be compelled to report higher profits than non-family companies. The increasing 
concentration of family ownership, the higher the earnings management actions taken. 
Companies with family members have their own characteristics, namely the involvement of 
members and the role of families in running or managing the company. The ownership structure 
is very important because of the problems caused by the company's breakdown of ownership 
and management. The important factor is family. The family is the controlling shareholder 
which causes the alignment of the interests of all family shareholders to lead to long-term 
management and is more concerned with the company's image. Therefore, the family is an 
important factor in quality earnings information. Yulaeli (2018) and Ghaleb, Kamardin, & 
Tabash (2020) show research on family ownership's significant negative effect on real earnings 
management. Because family is the controlling shareholder, the owner of the company can 
easily supervise the manager better. With the presence of family shareholders can focus more 
on long-term investment than other shareholders. Company owners also tend to focus on the 
company's reputation to build good relationships with third parties. Then it can be formulated 
into the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Family ownership has a significant negative impact on real earnings management. 
 
The audit committee is an important person in a company. The committee is called the 
eyes and ears of the board of commissioners in monitoring industry operations. The creation of 
effective monitoring in the company intersects with the amount of resources owned by the audit 
committee (Wicaksono, Pambudi, & Miftah (2016). Effective monitoring can prevent or reduce 
management from giving bad grades of financial reports. The characteristics of a good audit 
committee can affect the efficiency of the audit committee in carrying out its duties. For 
management to be more careful in carrying out company activities, real earnings management 
actions can be avoided in preparing company financial statements (Kharashgah, Amran, & 
Ishak, 2019). Haji-Abdullah & Wan-Hussin (2015) audit committee is measured by the size of 
the audit committee, audit committee meetings, audit committee independence and audit 
committee expertise have a significant negative impact on real earnings management. This 
research are in line with research by Wicaksono et al., (2016) which resulted in significant 
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negative ties on real earnings management. Then it can be formulated into the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: Audit committee has a significant negative impact on real earnings management 
 
The quality of financial statements is also an important factor in a company in terms of 
presentation, delivery, and so on to attract or trust investors. With this goal, the company will 
carry out earnings management. The quality of the financial statements will attract investors to 
invest in the company if it is good. One of them is audit quality which shows the auditor's ability 
to manage the company's financial information. The auditor's ability is always seen because it 
can weaken the quality of the company's financial statements. Boedhi & Ratnaningsih (2017) 
research shows a significant positive on real earnings management. This situation proves that 
good quality auditors will encourage companies to bring out real earnings management. This 
research aligns with Lestari & Aeni (2019) which shows a significant positive effect on real 
earnings management. Then it can be formulated into the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Audit quality has a significant positive impact on real earnings management 
 
In the financial statements can be seen how the condition of the financial statements. 
Companies that are in financial distress will also carry out earnings management. Financial 
distress is not a new thing to hear, especially in a company. Companies experiencing financial 
distress are natural but not on an ongoing basis. There are times when finances are stable. 
Financial distress shows that the company is experiencing financial distress gradually and leads 
to bankruptcy (Muljono & Suk, 2018). Companies that are in financial distress will carry out 
profit management both from excessive product production, reducing expenses from sales, 
general and administrative expenses that can increase or decrease profitability. Muljono & Suk 
(2018), Yulaeli (2018), and Feldo, Rinaningsih, & Yuliati (2019) research shows a significant 
negative impact between financial distress and real earnings management. Companies with 
negative earnings are prefer to carry out earnings management, namely by lowering profits and 
then being recognized as current expenses so that in the next period an increase in company 
profits can be seen, so that investors who view the financial statements will assume that the 
company has recovered from financial distress. 
 
H6: Financial distress has a significant negative impact on real earnings management 
 
Everyone must have good relations with friends, family, relatives and so on. The political 
relationship is a relationship related to the state. Political relationships tend to influence the 
influence of family ownership on earnings management (Ghaleb et al., 2020). Family plays an 
important role in a family because the family holds an important position in a company. Political 
relationships can have good and bad results as well as a person's reputation. The more famous 
the better because of the many connections to people. Research by Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, & 
Lodh (2015) and Apriyani et al., (2019) research shows a significant positive impact on real 
earnings management. It proves that politically connected companies can replace accrual to real 
earnings management due to public monitoring, which causes detection risk to increase so that 
politically connected companies prefer to carry out real earnings management because it is less 
detectable. Then it can be formulated into the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: Family ownership has a significant positive impact on real earnings management, 
moderated by political connections. 
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Figure 1. Research Conceptual Framework 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This research method used is the use of quantitative data. The subject of quantitative 
research is the use of one or more types of data whose purpose is to develop pre-existing 
research. The use of a descriptive approach because later it will produce descriptive data which 
basically uses a deductive-inductive approach. Quantitative methods are designed to test 
hypotheses, establish facts, prove relationships between variables, pass on descriptive statistics, 
and estimate results. Research models that use quantitative methods tend to be standardized, 
formal, structured and designed in such a way beforehand. This study also uses data with the 
type of collection time series, because the data used for research is over one period from 2016 
to 2020. Assessment in terms of the characteristics of the problem, this study is included in a 
causal comparative study (Causal-Comparative) where the characteristic type is to find a cause-
and-effect relationship between variables where the assessment is done by comparing the 
variables. While historical research because the data collected and used on the object of this 
research is data, time series which means that it has happened in the past. The population are 
manufacturing companies that listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016-2020. The 
secondary data from the company's financial and annual reports on IDX or the company's 
official website. The procedure for collecting data is literature study and documentation. 
Literature and documentation studies are used to obtain quantitative data from the financial 
statements. The research sample must have the following provisions: 
1. Manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
2. Manufacturing company that IPO before 2016. 
3. Manufacturing company that have complete financial statements. 
 
Analyzing data is the act of searching for information that can be useful to many people. 
The method in analyzing the data is needed to fulfill the question statement or to evaluate the 
Institutional Ownership (X1) 
Managerial Ownership (X2) 
Family Ownership (X3) 
Audit Committee (X4) 
Audit Quality (X5) 
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assumptions that have been put forward. PLS is an equation model derived from Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) with a variance or component-based SEM approach. The data 
analysis method in this research is used Partial Least Square (PLS). 
In the PLS method, the data is distributed free of charge without certain assumptions 
(categorical, interval, ratio, nominal and ordinal). PLS also uses random multiplication or 
bootstrap, where the assumption of normality is not an obstacle for PLS. In addition, PLS not 
required the use of minimum sample size in research, including even smaller sample sizes, can 
still use PLS. SEM is a useful technique to cover the weakness of the regression technique. 
SEM is divided into two methods: Covariance Based SEM (CBSEM) and methods Variance 
Based SEM or PLS. PLS is a powerful study review technique because it is not based on many 
assumptions. PLS is classified as a non-parametric type because it does not require a normal 
distribution of the PLS modeling data. 
The weight estimate is used as a form of the latent variable score element obtained based 
on the outer model (measurement model as the relationship between the indicator and its 
construct) and the inner model (structural model as a link to latent variables) is determined. The 
target of using PLS is to make assumptions. In making these assumptions, it is by estimating 
the correlation between variables, Sso that the value of the latent variable is obtained which 
will help researchers in making predictions. The result is the residual variance of the dependent 
variable which has been minimized. The latent variable is linear from the number of parameters.  
The evaluation of the limitations obtained using PLS is divided into the following types 
of categories: The first category is weight estimates which are useful for making estimates of 
latent variable scores. The second category is path estimation, which is a path estimate that 
reflects the variables connected to the latent variable with between latent variables and their 
indicator blocks (loading). 
 
Operational Definition and Variable Measurement 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is shares owned or purchased by institutions. The institution in 
question can be local or foreign. These institutions consist of mutual fund companies, insurance 
companies, pension funds, and other institutions in the form of companies. Institutional 
ownership in this study uses the ratio of issued shares and is ownership by institutions divided 
by total outstanding shares (Setiawati & Lieany, 2016). 
 
Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership can influence the nature of decisions and thus affect the 
development of the company. Managers favour their personalities such as salary increases or 
status, because managers are generally consumptive and productive. Managerial ownership in 
this study uses the ratio of issued shares and is the ownership by managerial members divided 
by total outstanding shares (Hidayanti & Paramita, 2014). 
 
Family Ownership 
An important factor in a company is the family because the family usually holds important 
positions or positions. Family ownership in this study uses the ratio of issued shares and is 
owned by family members divided by total outstanding shares (Ghaleb et al., 2020). 
 
Audit Committee 
1. Audit Committee Size 
The size of the audit committee uses the number of audit committee members 
(Kharashgah et al., 2019). 
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2. Independence of the Audit Committee  
The independence of the audit committee is determined by Bapepam LK (2012), as 
follows: 
a. People who are not in a legal consulting firm, public accounting firm, party providing 
insurance services or public appraisal service office, appraisal services, non-insurance 
services and other consulting services to issuers or related public companies in the last 6 
months, 
b. Except for independent commissioners, KA members are not persons who have worked 
or have the right to control, plan, supervise or lead the activities of issuers or public 
companies within the last 6 months. 
c. Does not own shares indirectly or directly in issuers or public companies. 
d. Has no affiliation with members of the directors, major shareholders or board of 
commissioners of the issuer or public company. 
e. Does not have a good business relationship indirectly or directly related to the business 
activities of the public company or issuer. 
 
3. Expertise of the Audit Committee 
Following the provisions of the Minister of State regarding BUMN (No. Per-
12/MBU/2012 and Bapepam LK (2012)), the audit committee member is at least 1 person 
and must meet the following: requirements: accounting education background or expertise 
in finance. The two regulations do not describe the characteristics of audit committees with 
accounting education or financial expertise. According to the SEC definition in IAI (2015), 
financial experts have education and experience, including treasurer, head of accounting, 
public accountant, auditor or other experience with similar functions. 
 
4. Audit Committee Meetings 
Measurements of audit committee meetings use the number of meetings or meetings 
held within a period of 1 period (Kharashgah et al., 2019). 
 
Audit Quality 
The auditor must be able to detect material errors in financial statements. The quality of 
good financial statements describes a good auditor. Audit quality is an effort or ability of the 
auditor to catch material misstatements and report these errors simultaneously (Boedhi & 
Ratnaningsih, 2017). Audit quality is measured using a dummy variable equal to '1' if a 
company employs Big 4 auditors and '0' otherwise. The Big 4 Audit Firms mentioned are as 
follows: 
1. Deloitte Firm 
2. PwC Firm 
3. Ernest & Young Firm 
4. KPMG Firm 
 
Financial Distress 
Finance is an important factor in the company. With stable finances, the company will 
easily run the company, otherwise if the company's finances are unstable, it will be difficult to 
run the company's operations. Financial distress reflect the company's inability to pay off its 
obligations (Melinda & Widyasari, 2019). The financial distress of this study was measured 
using the Altman model or the so-called Altman Z-Score formulated as follows: 
 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1,2 (
𝑊𝐶
𝑇𝐴
) +  1,4 (
𝑅𝐸
𝑇𝐴
) + 3,3 (
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝐴
) +  0,6 (
𝑀𝑉𝐸
𝐵𝑉𝐿
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WC = Working Capital 
TA    = Total Assets 
RE    = Retained Earnings 
EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Tax 
MVE = Market Value of Equity 
BVL = Book Value of Liabilities 
 
Real Earnings Management 
REM is defined as an act of manipulation or management action that drifts away from 
business provisions to meet nominal income. It detects that there is a real manipulation of 
activities by examining cash flow from operations or cash flow operations (CFO), production 
costs (PRC) and discretionary costs (DIE), found consistent evidence that companies try to 
avoid losses by offering discounts for increasing sales, exaggerating manufacturing to minimize 
the cost of goods sold and reducing discretionary costs aggressively to lower margins (Ghaleb 
et al., 2020). Thus, to detect real earnings management, three methods are used, namely as 
follows: 
1. Sales Manipulation 
Ningsih (2015) sales manipulation is an action taken by a company to get temporarily 
increase sales by providing discounts, excessive goods and longer terms. Actions taken 
inadvertently will affect profits thereby increasing profits and cash flow (Khuong, Ha, & 
Thu, 2019). Cash flow from operating activities is calculated as the residual or residual value 
of the calculation and is referred to as ACFO (abnormal cash flow from operations) with a 








) + 𝛽2 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 ………2) 
 
Description: 
CFOt   = Cash flow operations period t. 
Assetst-1     = total assets of the previous year. 
Salest      = total sales in period t. 
∆Salest     = change in total sales minus the previous year's sales. 
 
2. Overproduction 
Production is an activity that creates new products or adds quality to goods to meet needs 
(Adiguzel, 2013). Companies can produce or manufacture excess products because this 
action can lower the cost of goods sold. Production costs are calculated as the residual value 
of the calculation and are called APRC (abnormal production level). A large APRC indicates 
high real earnings management. This method can reduce COGS and increase profits 







) + 𝛽2 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 ………3) 
 
Description: 
PRCt        = sum of changes in inventory (∆INV) and cost of goods sold (COGSt) at time t. 
Assetst-1   = total assets of the previous year. 
Salest       = total sales in period t. 
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∆Salest            = change in total sales minus the previous year's sales. 
∆Salest-1         = change in sales related to sales of tofu in advance. 
 
3. Discretionary Cost Reduction  
Discretionary costs can be reduced or increased according to the company's decision 
(Farouk & Bashir, 2017). The discretionary costs are the sum of general and administrative 
expenses, research and development expenses, advertising expenses, and selling expenses. 
Examples of discretionary costs are training costs, advertising costs, maintenance costs and so 
on. The company minimizes these reported costs to increase revenue. Discretionary costs are 
calculated as the residual or residual value of the calculation and are called ADIE (abnormal 
discretionary expenses) with a small ADIE indicating high earnings management. Discretionary 
costs are generally paid in cash, this reduces or decreases cash outflows and has a positive effect 







) + 𝛽2 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 ………4) 
 
Description: 
DIEt  = discretionary costs during period t.  
Assetst-1     = total assets of the previous year. 
Salest-1       = total sales in the previous year. 
 
Company Size  is a size in the form of small or large in the company monitored from its assets. 
Firm size in this study uses the natural logarithm of total assets (Ghaleb et al., 2020). Leverage 
is used to measure company assets that are financed with long-term debt. Leverage estimates 
total debt divided by total assets (Ghaleb et al., 2020). 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) in this study uses total net income divided by total assets. Companies 
that manipulate earnings tend to be motivated to improve company performance to make it look 
good (Ghaleb et al., 2020). 
 
Market to Book Value of Equity (MTBV) in this study uses the market value of shares or market 




The moderating variable of this research is political connection. Political relations can 
be used as the supporting indicators of a company. In this study, political connection is used as 
a moderating variable. Political connections can weaken or strengthen a company because of 
that reputation (Chandra, 2021). It is stated that there is a political connection if: 
1. One director or board of commissioners arranges positions as a member of the state 
parliament/high state official (government cabinet), state institution official, and member of 
a political party. 
2. There is one of the director or board of commissioners as a former high-ranking official or 
politician. 
3. One of the owners/founders of the company or controlling shareholder is a government 
official / former government official and politician. 
4. There is one of the director, commissioners, owners, or shareholders who have close 
relationships with politicians, political parties, government officials or former government 
THE EFFECT OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS ON REAL 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 




officials. To limit subjectivity, close relationships in this study were determined according 
to family relationships and cases where close relatives or friends with politicians. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The table presented below shows 192 companies listed on the IDX during the 2016-2020 
period. During that period, there were also 49 companies whose IPOs after 2016, and there were 
eight companies whose financial statements were not available, there was 1 company whose 
company withdrew from the IDX. Thus the companies that realize the requirements to be 
researched are 134 companies with a total data sample of 670 data and there are 107 data outliers 
so that the data that can be studied reaches 563 data samples that can be studied. This study 
uses independent variables, namely institutional ownership, managerial ownership, family 
ownership, financial distress and audit committee. While the dependent factor is real earnings 
management. The control factors are leverage, return on assets, company size, and market to 
book value of equity. 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Criteria 
No Description Samples 
1 Manufacturing Company Listed on the IDX 192 
2 IPO After 2016 (49) 
3 Incomplete Financial Statements (8) 





The table below displays descriptive statistics for regression such as dependent, 
independent, moderating, and control variables. The table presents the entire sample for 
descriptive statistics, including minimum, maximum, standard deviation and mean values. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N. Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
REM 563 -1.071 1.091 0.024 0.317 
KI 563 0.000 1.000 0.737 0.238 
KM 563 0.000 0.482 0.039 0.084 
KF 563 0.000 0.513 0.037 0.092 
AC SIZE 563 3.000 4.000 3.036 0.185 
AC MEET 563 0.000 22.000 5.801 3.360 
AC IND 563 2.000 4.000 3.021 0.222 
AC EXPER 563 0.000 4.000 2.075 0.794 
KK 563 -7.388 27.680 3.313 3.863 
SIZE (IDR 000.000) 563 89.328 295.830.000 9.901.154 25.013.202 
LEV 563 0.065 2.147 0.495 0.296 
ROA 563 -0.401 0.921 0.037 0.101 
MTBV 563 -8.540 20.594 1.555 2.004 
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The minimum real earnings management (REM) figure of -1,071 is found at PT Akasha 
Wira International Tbk. The maximum number shows 1,091 found at PT. Alakasa Industrindo 
Tbk and the average value shows 0.024 with a standard deviation of 31.7% which means that 
the average company performs earnings management actions on real activities in the company. 
We have often heard of earnings management and many companies do it so that it is expected 
to be further raised to get bonuses. 
For institutional ownership (KI) as measured by the percentage of share ownership of 
institutional companies from 563 samples that have a minimum score of 0.000 or 0%, the 
maximum value of 1,000 or 100% is found at PT Lion Metal Works Tbk, the average number 
is 0.737 or 73.7% in the standard 23.8% deviation. This situation shows that there are 
companies whose share ownership is not owned by institutions called 0%. The average number 
is greater than the standard deviation, which means that the change between the maximum and 
minimum figures during the observation period is small or there is no relatively small gap 
between the lowest and highest institutional ownership. 
Managerial ownership (KM) shows a minimum number of 0.000 or 0%, the maximum 
number shows 0.482 or 48.2% is found in PT Ultra Jaya Milk Industry & Trading Company 
Tbk, which means that the management has a lot of shares so that managerial ownership is high. 
The mean value shows 0.039 or 3.9% with a standard deviation of 8.4%. This shows that there 
are companies whose shares are not owned by managers and companies whose shares are 
owned by company managers. 
Family ownership (KF) shows a minimum value of 0.000 or 0%, the maximum number 
shows 0.513 or 51.3% taken by PT Intanwijaya Internasional Tbk for 2020 and the average 
value shows 0.037 or 3.7% with a standard deviation of 9.2%. This situation indicates that there 
are companies whose shares are not owned by the family, namely 0% and there are companies 
whose share ownership is also owned by the family. 
Audit Committee (AC) is measured by AC Size, AC Meetings, AC Independent, and AC 
Expertise. AC Size (AC S) displays a minimum number of 3, a maximum number of 4, the 
average number shows 3,036 and a standard deviation of 0.185. This situation shows that 
companies do not have audit committee members and have audit committee members. 
Generally from the sample, many trains consist of 3 people so that on the average value we can 
see it too. Based on the Financial Services Authority Regulation No. 55 / POJK.04 / 2015, the 
total number of people who must be on the audit committee in each company has been 
determined. In particular, the regulation stipulates that the number of audit committees must be 
a minimum of 3 (three) persons which an independent commissioner must chair. This situation 
shows that on average, all companies have KA of 3 people. 
AC meeting (AC M) displays a minimum score of 0, a maximum number of 22, an 
average of 5,801 and a standard deviation of 3,360. This situation shows that companies hold 
meetings and some that do not hold meetings within a year. On average, companies that hold 
audit committee meetings are 5-6 times a year in the sample. Some companies do not disclose 
the number of audit committee meetings in the annual report. The Financial Services Authority 
Regulation No. 55 / POJK.04 / 2015 explains that the AC is expected to hold regular meetings 
at least once every three months. This is done to increase the effectiveness in carrying out the 
monitoring function. 
AC independence (AC I) displays a minimum score of 2, a maximum score of 4, an 
average number of 3,021, and a standard deviation of 0.222. This situation proves that there are 
companies whose audit committee members are independent and some are not. On average in 
the company, because there are three audit committee members, it inadvertently affects the 
independence of the audit committee of 3 people. According to the regulations in Indonesia, 
the chairman of the audit committee is an independent commissioner and members of the 
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company's audit committee are parties who are not affiliated with the company, which means 
that the audit committee is an independent member from outside the company. 
AC expertise (AC E) shows a minimum score of 0, a maximum score of 4, an average 
value of 2,075 and a standard deviation of 0.794. This situation proves that the expertise of KA 
members in the field of accounting and finance on average, each company has 2 people who 
have experience working in these fields. For the variable of financial distress (KK) shows a 
minimum value of -7,388 owned by PT Panasia Indo Resources Tbk. The maximum value 
indicates the value of 27,680 is found at PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk. The average 
value shows 3,313 which proves that the sample in the study is included in the save zone with 
a standard deviation of 3,863. This proves that there are companies experiencing distress and 
there are not distressed in terms of the save zone or gray area. From here it can be seen, the 
prediction of the bankruptcy of a company. 
For the company size variable (SIZE), which uses the measurement of company assets 
presented in the table is millions of rupiah. The maximum amount is IDR 295,830,000,000,000 
owned by PT Astra International Tbk, the minimum amount is IDR 89,327,328,853 owned by 
PT Primarindo Asia Infrastructure Tbk. The average number shows 9,901,154,936,807 with a 
standard deviation value of 25,013,202,406,256 indicating that the standard deviation of 
variation is low. Leverage (LEV) displays an average number of 0.495 which indicates the 
average amount of company assets financed by debt is 49.5%. The lowest number from the test 
results is 0.065 which PT Inti Agri Resources own. The highest value from the test results, 
which is 2,147, is owned by PT Argo Pantes Tbk with a standard deviation of 0.296, which 
means that the standard deviation is highly variable. Return on assets (ROA) displays a 
minimum score of -0.401 owned by PT Keramika Indonesia Assosiasi Tbk. a maximum number 
of 0.921 owned by PT Merck Tbk. The average amount is 0.037 with a standard deviation is 
0.101. It shows that the percentage of profits obtained by the company with its assets. 
Market to book value of equity (MTBV) showing a minimum number of -8,540 is found 
in PT Century Textile Tbk. The maximum value of 20,594 is found at PT Hanjaya Mandala 
Sampoerna Tbk. The average number is 1,555 with a standard deviation of 2,004. This situation 
proves that the company's growth prospects are stated in market price which are considered to 
be included in the stock price. The average number is lower than the standard deviation, which 




Table 3. Statistic Descriptive Dummy Variable 
Variable Category Total Percent 
Audit Quality 1.: BIG 4 230 40.9% 
0 : NON BIG 4 333 59,1% 
Politic Connections 1 : Connection 234 41.6% 
0 : No Connection 329 58,1% 
 
It can be seen that the audit quality variable (AQ) is categorized into 2 categories, namely 
KAP BIG 4 and NON-KAP BIG 4. It can be concluded that 230 data or as much as 40.9% of 
data use the services of KAP BIG 4. A total of 333 data or 59.1% of data do not use services of 
KAP BIG 4. This situation proves that KAP BIG 4 is less than NON KAP BIG 4. 
Political connections (PC) are divided into two, namely, there are connections and there 
are no political connections. It can be concluded that there are 234 data whose members have 
political connections or 41.6% and as many as 329 data whose members have no connection or 
58.4%. This situation proves that the political connections in companies are greater than those 
without political connections. 
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Outer Model Evaluation 
 
Measurement model or external model shows how each parameter block is related to its 
latent variable. In the analyzed model, the correlation between latent variables and their 
parameters is determined by analysing the external model or measurement model. This process 
is carried out to find out that the indicators or research constructs have met the criteria of validity 




Convergent validity is carried out to measure the accuracy of indicators in displaying 
latent variables. This test can be tested by looking at the Outer Loadings and Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) values. If the correlation of individual reflection measurement with the 
construct to be measured by looking at the outer loading with a value > 0.60 and the AVE has 
a value > 0.5, it is considered to have met the criteria of convergent validity. According to Chin 
(taken by Imam Ghozali), an outer loading figure of around 0.50–0.60 is acceptable.  
 
Table 4. Loading Factor 
  VAR KI KM KF AC S AC M AC I AC E AQ KK REM KP KF*KP 
KI 1.000            
KM  1.000           
KF   1.000          
AC S    0.819         
AC M     0.674        
AC I      0.877       
AC E       0.129      
AQ        1.000     
KK         1.000    
REM          1.000   
KP           1.000  
KF*KP            0.944 
 
From the test results, each indicator has a high relationship with each construct because 
outer loadings explain the index's strength that affects each construct (latent variable) except 
audit committee expertise 0.129 is not enough. 
 
From the test results to show the value of AVE on this model already meets the criteria 
of convergent validity because the value AVE on this study has been worth > 0.5, except for 
the audit committee variable whose value is < 0.5, which is 0.489, so this variable does not 
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Discriminant validity relates to the principle that different indicators should not have high 
values. There are 3 criteria for this test where if it is fulfilled then the data has met the 
discriminant validity criteria. These criteria include cross loading which requires that the 
indicators must be united on each variable with a minimum value of 0.7. 
 
Table 6. Cross Loadings 
 KI KM KF AC AQ KK REM PC KF*PC SIZE LEV ROA MTBV 
KI 1.000 -0.429 -0.431 -0.230 0.277 0.100 -0.046 -0.002 0.032 0.100 -0.027 0.049 0.048 
KM -0.429 1.000 0.861 -0.017 -0.094 -0.021 -0.076 -0.025 0.023 -0.163 -0.047 0.030 0.018 
KF -0.431 0.861 1.000 -0.023 -0.064 0.010 -0.094 -0.063 -0.122 -0.117 -0.140 0.055 0.060 
AC S -0.177 -0.017 -0.014 0.900 0.075 0.022 -0.082 0.208 -0.047 0.213 -0.032 -0.002 0.085 
AC M -0.178 0.004 -0.014 0.674 0.067 -0.049 -0.067 0.106 0.035 0.172 0.056 0.014 -0.015 
AC I -0.191 -0.001 -0.001 0.821 -0.015 -0.053 -0.042 0.179 -0.032 0.099 -0.030 -0.053 -0.029 
AC E 0.056 0.149 0.152 0.129 0.068 -0.037 0.009 -0.034 -0.042 -0.050 -0.014 -0.031 0.018 
AQ 0.277 -0.094 -0.064 0.062 1.000 0.249 -0.052 0.106 0.004 0.369 -0.188 0.121 0.052 
KK 0.100 -0.021 0.010 -0.022 0.249 1.000 -0.454 0.106 -0.080 0.138 -0.530 0.469 0.460 
REM -0.046 -0.076 -0.094 -0.086 -0.052 -0.454 1.000 -0.182 0.015 -0.045 0.255 -0.400 -0.234 
PC -0.002 -0.025 -0.063 0.210 0.106 0.106 -0.182 1.000 -0.022 0.310 0.014 0.113 0.073 
KF*PC 0.032 0.023 -0.122 -0.016 0.004 -0.080 0.015 -0.022 1.000 0.001 0.093 -0.024 -0.064 
SIZE 0.100 -0.163 -0.117 0.221 0.369 0.138 -0.045 0.310 0.001 1.000 -0.101 0.106 0.179 
LEV -0.027 -0.047 -0.140 0.000 -0.188 -0.530 0.255 0.014 0.093 -0.101 1.000 -0.252 -0.136 
ROA 0.049 0.030 0.055 -0.007 0.121 0.469 -0.400 0.113 -0.024 0.106 -0.252 1.000 0.174 
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The test results show that constructs with adequate discriminatory validity can be caused 
by the value of the loading of the expected structure being greater than the value of loadings 
from other structures. Two variables do not meet these criteria, namely audit committee 
meetings and audit committee expertise where the value is < 0.7. The Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
is another way to test discriminant validity by comparing each construct of the square root of 
the AVE greater than the correlation value between constructs in the model. 
 
Table 7. Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
 KI KF KM KK AC PC AQ LEV REM MTBV KF*PC ROA SIZE 
KI 1.000             
KF -0.431 1.000            
KM -0.429 0.861 1.000           
KK 0.100 0.010 -0.021 1.000          
AC -0.230 -0.023 -0.017 -0.022 0.699         
PC -0.002 -0.063 -0.025 0.106 0.210 1.000        
AQ 0.277 -0.064 -0.094 0.249 0.062 0.106 1.000       
LEV -0.027 -0.140 -0.047 -0.530 0.000 0.014 -0.188 1.000      
REM -0.046 -0.094 -0.076 -0.454 -0.086 -0.182 -0.052 0.255 1.000     
MTBV 0.048 0.060 0.018 0.460 0.030 0.073 0.052 -0.136 -0.234 1.000    
KF*PC 0.032 -0.122 0.023 -0.080 -0.016 -0.022 0.004 0.093 0.015 -0.064 1.000   
ROA 0.049 0.055 0.030 0.469 -0.007 0.113 0.121 -0.252 -0.400 0.174 -0.024 1.000  
SIZE 0.100 -0.117 -0.163 0.138 0.221 0.310 0.369 -0.101 -0.045 0.179 0.001 0.106 1.000 
 
Test Results prove that all constructs have met the criteria. This is because the value of 
the square root of AVE is greater than the correlation value between constructs. Heterotrait-
Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) is the third criterion in testing discriminant validity by suggesting that 
the value should be less than 0.9 which means good and discriminant validity has been 
achieved. 
 
Table 8. Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio 
 KI KF KM KK AC PC AQ LEV REM MTBV KF*PC ROA SIZE 
KI              
KF 0,431             
KM 0,429 0,861            
KK 0,100 0,010 0,021           
AC 0,272 0,082 0,077 0,073          
PC 0,002 0,063 0,025 0,106 0,238         
AQ 0,277 0,064 0,094 0,249 0,102 0,106        
LEV 0,027 0,140 0,047 0,530 0,059 0,014 0,188       
REM 0,046 0,094 0,076 0,454 0,090 0,182 0,052 0,255      
MTBV 0,048 0,060 0,018 0,460 0,066 0,073 0,052 0,136 0,234     
KF*PC 0,032 0,122 0,023 0,080 0,071 0,022 0,004 0,093 0,015 0,064    
ROA 0,049 0,055 0,030 0,469 0,045 0,113 0,121 0,252 0,400 0,174 0,024   
SIZE 0,100 0,117 0,163 0,138 0,242 0,310 0,369 0,101 0,045 0,179 0,001 0,106  
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The test results display the number HTMT <0.9 then the model has met the discriminant 
validity criteria. It is recommended that HTMT < 0.9 is very good and means that discriminant 
validity has been achieved. 
 
Reliability 
Composite reliability is an index scale structural, which can be seen in displaying the 
latent variable coefficients. There are two measuring tools used to evaluate the reliability of 
composite materials, namely internal consistency / internal consistency and Cronbach's alpha. 
In the measurement, if the value reaches > 0.6 then it can be judged that all constructs are 
reliable and have test credibility / high level of reliability where this situation is because the 
measurement instrument of each variable has a fairly high correlation. 
 
Table 9. Composite Reliability 
 
 
From the test results, the composite reliability number for all variables > 0.6 has met there 
requirements composite validity. The Cronbach Alpha score on all variables > 0.6 shows the 
variables in the model have met the criteria composite reliability. 
 
Inner Model Evaluation 
They are testing the inner model, commonly referred to as the evaluation of the structural 
model in which there is an influence between latent variables, and assessing the level of model 
suitability. In a study, the researcher evaluated the internal model analysis through hypothesis 
testing and model fit consisting of R-square as the dependent construct, Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SMRM) and GoF Index. 
 
R-Square 
R-Square can review the results of the evaluation of the structural model which shows the 
model if the value is 0.75 it means strong, 0.50 it means moderate, and 0.25 it means weak. 
 
Table 10. R-Square 
Variable R-Square Adjusted R-Square 
REM 0.296 0.281 
 
Variable Cronbach's Alpha Composite Reliability 
KI 1.000 1.000 
KM 1.000 1.000 
KF 1.000 1.000 
AC 0.638 0.757 
AQ 1.000 1.000 
KK 1.000 1.000 
REM 1.000 1.000 
KP 1.000 1.000 
KF*KP 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 1.000 1.000 
LEV 1.000 1.000 
ROA 1.000 1.000 
MTBV 1.000 1.000 
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The result of the R-Square number test is 0.296. The R-Square Adjusted number gives a 
value of 0.281 for the REM variable, which means it is weak. The Adjusted R-Square value is 
0.281 explaining that the variability of the construct and its interaction is 28.1 which proves 
that real earnings management can be explained by 28.1%, while the rest explained by other 
variables outside this study. 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SMRM) 
This test is interpreted as the difference between the observed correlation and the 
inference correlation matrix model. The SMRM value is called the size of the correlation matrix 
fit in the model. SMRM value < 0.1 indicates that the model is fit. 
 
Table 11. Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
Variable Saturated Model Estimated Model 
SRMR 0.051 0.051 
 
The results prove the SRMR value < 0.1 which indicates that the research model is fit or 
in accordance with the data. So it can be concluded that the model is suitable. 
 
GoF Index 
The overall model as measured by the root of the average AVE multiplied by the average 
Adjusted R-Square. If the results obtained from the root are as follows, it can be interpreted 
according to the value if GoF 0.10 means weak, 0.25 means moderate, and 0.36 means strong. 
Results GoF valued Index 0509, which means this research model is strong category 
 




Root R2 GoF Index 
GoF 0.961 0.530 0.509 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
 
Path coefficients are outputs that aim to see the direct influence between latent variables. 
When doing this test, what must be considered is showing the magnitude, direction, and 
significance of the influence between variables with a T-Statistic value > 1.96 and a P-Value < 
0.05, which means that it has a significant effect. To see the positive and negative properties, it 
is taken from the original sample where if it shows - / + then the nature of the relationship is 
following the original sample. 
 
Table 13. Hypothesis Testing 
Variable Original Sample T Statistics P Values 
KI -> REM -0.107 3.107 0.002 
KM -> REM -0.009 0.144 0.886 
KF -> REM -0.113 1.855 0.064 
AC -> REM -0.113 2.235 0.026 
AQ -> REM 0.082 2.178 0.030 
KK -> REM -0.328 5.147 0.000 
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Hypothesis Testing 1 
The test results show that the relationship between KI and REM is significant with a T-
statistic value of 3.107 which means > 1.96 and P-Values of 0.002 which means <0.05. Original 
sample shows -0.107. So the relationship between KI and REM is significantly negative. Then 
H1 in this research were presented that "Institutional ownership have a significantly negative 
impact on the real earnings management" acceptable.  
The percentage of institutional ownership affects the company's management decision to 
carry out earnings management, which means that how big or small the institutional ownership 
affects earnings management actions. It shows that the size of the shares owned by the 
institution can monitor the company's operations and limit the manager's ability to profit from 
themselves, so that managers are not relaxed in manipulating the real profits generated by the 
company. According to research by Setiawati & Lieany (2016), these results and  Susanto & 
Pradipta (2016) also showed a significant negative impact on real earnings management.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 2 
From the test results show that the relationship between KM and REM is not significant 
with a T-statistic of 0.144 which means <1.96 and P-Values of 0.886 which means > 0.05. 
Original sample shows -0.009. So the relationship between KM and REM is not significant. 
Then H2 in this research were presented that "Managerial ownership has a significant positive 
impact on the real earnings management" is not accepted.  
The size of the shares by managers cannot change opportunistic attitudes and behavior in 
real earnings management practices because managers' shares do not significantly affect 
institutional shares. Therefore, the institution monitors the manager's opportunistic behavior 
even though the manager is likely to take earnings management actions. According to research 
by Kamardin (2014) and Hidayanti & Paramita (2014), these results show a significant positive 
impact on real earnings management.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 3 
From the results show the relationship between KF and REM is not significant with a T-
statistic of 1.855 which means <1.96 and P-Values of 0.064 which means > 0.05. Original 
sample -0.113. So the relationship between KF and REM is not significant. Then H3 in this 
research were presented that "Family ownership have significantly negative impact on the real 
earnings management" is not accepted. This situation proves that family share ownership cannot 
monitor and reduce the actions of managers in real earnings management practices. So family 
ownership cannot control the opportunistic actions of managers in creating profits for personal 
purposes that sometimes do not benefit the company. These results are not in line with Yulaeli 
(2018) and Ghaleb et al. that shows a significant negative impact on real earnings management, 
which means that family ownership can control company management. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 4 
The test results show that the relationship between KA and REM is significant with a T-
statistic of 2.235 which means > 1.96 and P-Values of 0.026 which means <0.05. Original 
sample -0.113. So the relationship between KA and REM is significantly negative. Then H4 in 
this research were presented that "Audit committee has a significantly negative impact on the 
real earnings management" acceptable. 
The company has sufficient resources to supervise or monitor the company's operational 
activities if it has a large audit committee size because the audit committee functions as a 
supervisor related to the resources she/he has. To not harm minority shareholders, an 
independent audit committee is needed to ensure that financial decisions are made in the best 
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interests of all shareholders. Audit committee can increase supervision on preparation of 
financial statements prepared by managers. So that managers feel inhibited in their freedom to 
manipulate financial statements so that earnings management actions are suppressed. 
According to research by Haji-Abdullah & Wan-Hussin (2015) and Wicaksono et al. (2016), 
these results also showed a significant negative on real earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 5 
The results show the relationship between AQ and REM is significant with a T-statistic 
of 2.178 which means > 1.96 and P-Values of 0.030 which means <0.05. Original sample 0.082. 
So the relationship between AQ and REM is significantly positive. Then H5 in this research 
were presented that "Audit quality has a significant positive impact on the real earnings 
management" acceptable. A better quality auditor can reduce accrual earnings management and 
switch to real earnings management when the company has a strong urge to require earnings 
management. According to research by Boedhi & Ratnaningsih (2017) and Lestari & Aeni 
(2019), these results showed that there is a significant positive impact on real earnings 
management.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 6 
The test results show the relationship between KK and REM is significant with a T-
statistic of 5,147 which means > 1.96 and P-Values of 0.000 which means <0.05. Original 
sample -0.328. So the relationship between KK and REM is significantly negative. Then H6 in 
this research was presented that "Financial distress has a significant negative impact on the real 
earnings management" acceptable. The higher the distress experienced by the company will 
increase the real earnings management carried out by management to influence investors that 
the company is in a safe position to avoid distress. The higher the distress of a company will 
not affect the company's management. Management takes these actions to attract investors and 
maintain the company's name in the eyes of investors and the public. These results according 
to research by Muljono & Suk (2018), Yulaeli (2018), and Feldo, Rinaningsih, & Yuliati (2019) 
also showed that there is a significant negative impact on real earnings management. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 7 
The test results show that the relationship between KF and REM moderated by PC is not 
significant with a T-statistic of 1.356 which means <1.96 and P-Values of 0.176 which means 
> 0.05. Number of original sample -0.038. So the relationship between KF and REM moderated 
by PC is not significant. Then H7 in this research were presented that "Family ownership have 
significant positive impact on the real earnings management moderated by political connection" 
is not accepted. There is no proven political connection because the company is indicated to 
have political relations, does not have legal leniency if it is proven to carry out earnings 
management. These result are not fit with research by Braam et al., (2015) and Apriyani et al., 




CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
This study is used to analyze the effect of good corporate governance and financial 
distress on real earnings management moderated by political connections. Based on the results 
of the analysis above, it can be concluded that institutional ownership has a significant negative 
impact on real earnings management, managerial ownership has no significant impact on real 
earnings management, family ownership has no significant impact on real earnings 
THE EFFECT OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS ON REAL 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 




management, audit committee has a significant negative impact on real earnings management, 
audit quality has a significant positive impact on real earnings management, financial distress 
have a significant negative impact on real earnings management, and family ownership has no 
significant impact on real earnings management which is moderated by political connections. 
This study still has shortcomings and limitations to be used as a consideration for future 
research in order to get result a better for future research. The limitations in this study are the 
research sample is a manufacturing company listed on the IDX, there are 49 companies listed 
on the IDX whose IPO after 2015, there is 1 company that is not listed on the IDX, and there 
are 8 companies whose data are incomplete. 
There are suggestions for researchers to give to previous researchers, which adding a 
moderating variable for each existing independent variable in order to give more influence on 
the dependent variable in order to produce a good test, expand in the selection of research 
objects and using a suitable measurement method for each variable. Companies should pay 
more attention to the factors that influence real earnings management actions considering that 
real earnings management is more favored by managers than accruals because real earnings 
management has a direct influence on current and future cash flows, making it more difficult to 
detect than accruals. If the company is not careful about real earnings management actions, it 
will have a negative impact on operating performance in the future which has the potential to 
reduce the value of the company. Investors should be more careful in making investment 
decisions, and pay attention to factors that affect the company's management actions that benefit 
themselves, but reduce the value of the company in the future. This is necessary so that investors 
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